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Power-Conferring Treaties: TheMeaning of
‘Investment’ in the ICSID Convention
TONY COLE AND ANUJ KUMAR VAKSHA∗
Abstract
It is now standard in contemporary international law commentary to note that the latter part
of the twentieth century has seen a move away from the traditional understanding of inter-
national law as fundamentally based on the consent of states. As just two examples, customary
international law has in some contexts become more influential than treaties and human
rights obligations are now recognized as often binding states even when they have signed no
treaty acknowledging their existence. Treaty interpretation, by contrast, has remained focused
upon the parties to a treaty, with even textualist approaches to treaty interpretation justified as
the best means of ascertaining the intent of the contracting states. The purpose of the present
article is to highlight the existence of a subset of treaties forwhich even a teleological approach
to interpretation fails to capture the central importance for the treaty of entities other than
the contracting states. These ‘power-conferring treaties’ do not merely entrust tribunals with
the power to effectively fashion the means by which a treaty’s goals should be achieved. To
varying degrees, they grant control of the treaty itself, including, at times, both its enforcement
and the very meaning of its terms, to entities other than the contracting states. As a result,
the traditional emphasis in treaty interpretation on the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty, and
the precise language in which the treaty is written, will fail to generate an interpretation
that faithfully captures the manner in which the treaty genuinely functions. The article then
illustrates the potential impact of the power-conferring nature of a treaty through an analysis
of the meaning of the term ‘investment’ in the International Convention for Settlement of
InvestmentDisputes.This isoneof themostcontroversial topics incontemporaryinternational
investment law, with an enormous impact upon the jurisdiction of ICSID arbitral tribunals. It
is argued that recognizing the power-conferring nature of the ICSID Convention provides an
enhanced understanding of the way in which this term should be interpreted.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is now standard in contemporary international law commentary to note that the
latter part of the twentieth century has seen a move away from the traditional
understanding of international law as fundamentally based on the consent of
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states.1 As just two examples, customary international law has in some contexts
becomemore influential than treaties,2 andhumanrightsobligationsarenowrecog-
nized as often binding states, even when they have signed no treaty acknowledging
their existence.3
Treaties, too, have changed. They remain an agreement between states4 and, as
with any agreement, the consent of the parties is essential.5 However, states have
demonstrated an increased willingness to place their treaty-making powers in the
hands of other actors.6 Treaties have, of course, long been used to promote non-
state interests, particularly to protect participants in international business.7 More
recently, however, actors whomay traditionally have benefited from the exercise of
a state’s treaty-making powers have been allowed a more active role in the creation
and even execution of treaties.
This change has, however, had little impact on the interpretation of treaties.
Tribunalsmay adopt a teleological approach to the interpretationof treaty language
where a treaty is seen as intended by the contracting states to achieve certain goals
not easily captured by precise language.8 However, even a teleological approach to
treaty interpretation remains fundamentally focused on the contracting states, as
the tribunal simply understands those states as having granted it the authority to
fashion its own rules to achieve the treaty’s goals, rather than being strictly bound
by the specific language of the treaty.9
The purpose of this article is to highlight the existence of a subset of treaties for
which even a teleological approach to interpretation fails to capture the central
importance for the treaty of entities other than the contracting states. These
1 See, e.g., J. Brunne´e, ‘Consent’, inMax Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2010): ‘a review of the
main international law-making processes reveals that the consent of individual States often plays only an
indirect role in creating the rules that bind them, and sometimes none at all’; M. Lister, ‘The Legitimating
Role of Consent in Internation al Law’, (2011) 11 Chicago JIL forthcoming: ‘state consent has an important,
though limited, role in establishing the legitimacy of some parts of international law.’
2 See, e.g., A. N. Pronto, ‘Some Thoughts on the Making of International Law’, (2008) 19 EJIL 601, at 613,
explaining the International Law Commission’s reticence to encourage negotiation of a treaty based on its
draft articles on theResponsibility of States for internationallywrongful acts as ‘amount[ing] to a sort of post-
modernist take on the codification of international law, which minimized the importance of treaties while
preferring the development of the law through the continuing development of customary international
law’.
3 A. Bianchi, ‘Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens’, (2008) 19 EJIL 491, at 491, noting that ‘[t]here is an
almost intrinsic relationship between peremptory norms and human rights’.
4 This is still fundamentally true, even though it is now recognized that international organizations can also
enter into treaties. See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations.
5 Brunne´e, supra note 1, at para. 5: ‘States must consent to be legally bound by a treaty.’
6 See generally D. Hollis, ‘Why State Consent Still Matters: Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing
Sources of International Law’, (2005) 2 Berkeley JIL 1.
7 See, e.g., the 1226 treaty inwhichEmperor Frederick II of theHolyRomanEmpire secured concessions for the
citizens ofMarseille that hadpreviously only been available to the citizens of Pisa andGenoa. S. K.Hornbeck,
‘TheMost-Favored-Nation Clause’, (1909) 3 AJIL 395, at 398.
8 See, e.g., F. G. Jacobs, ‘Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special Reference to the Draft
Conventionon theLawofTreatiesbefore theViennaDiplomaticConference’, (1969)18 ICLQ318, at 319: ‘The
teleological approach seeks to interpret the treaty in the light of its objects and purposes.’ This approach has,
for example, famously been adopted by the EuropeanCourt of Justice. H. G. Schermers andD. F.Waelbroeck,
Judicial Protection in the European Union (2001), para. 40: ‘In several cases the Court had to . . . choose the
interpretation which best serves the purpose for which the provision was made.’
9 Ibid.
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‘power-conferring treaties’ do not merely entrust tribunals with the power to ef-
fectively fashion themeans bywhich a treaty’s goals should be achieved. To varying
degrees, they grant control of the treaty itself, including, at times, both its enforce-
ment and the verymeaning of its terms, to entities other than the contracting states.
As a result, the traditional emphasis in treaty interpretation on the ‘object and pur-
pose’ of the treaty, and the precise language inwhich the treaty iswritten,will fail to
generate an interpretation that faithfully captures the manner in which the treaty
genuinely functions.
This is not to say that the traditional rules of treaty interpretation, as codified in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), have no role in the interpret-
ation of power-conferring treaties. They are, after all, now recognized as reflecting
customary law regarding treaty interpretation.10 This articlewill attempt to demon-
strate, however, that recognition of the power-conferring nature of a treaty can have
an important impact on the way that these traditional tools must be applied.
It will do this through an analysis of a highly contentious topic in contempor-
ary international investment law – the meaning of the term ‘investment’ in Article
25(1) of the International Convention for Settlement of Investment Disputes (the
‘Convention’). Article 25(1) identifies the jurisdictional limits of arbitrations that
can be pursued at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID). However, although it specifies that any dispute arbitrated under the Con-
vention must arise directly out of an ‘investment’, the Convention does not clarify
what the term ‘investment’ means.11 The meaning of ‘investment’ in Article 25(1)
has, as a result, become a primary area of dispute within ICSID arbitration, with ar-
bitral tribunals reaching conflicting interpretations of the term, based on differing
conceptions of the rationale for the term’s inclusion.12
This article will demonstrate that recognizing the ways in which the ICSID
Convention confers powers upon entities other than the ICSID contracting states to
determine themeaning of ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) provides important insights
into how the term should be interpreted.
Section2of thearticlewill clarifywhat it is fora treaty tobepower-conferring, and
what the impact on the interpretation of a treaty will be of the recognition that it is
power-conferring. Section 3 will then turn specifically to international investment
10 See, e.g., U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007), 7: ‘Articles 31–33 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties should therefore be seen as evidence . . . of the rules that apply according to customary
international law.’ But see J. Klabbers, ‘Virtuous Interpretation’, inM. Fitzmaurice, O. Elias, and P. Merkouris
(eds.), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2010), 17, at 30: ‘The conclusion
thus presents itself that no rule on interpretation could likely be of customary law nature; interpretation
rules simply are of a different quality than ordinary norms of behaviour.’
11 C. Schreuer, ‘Investment Disputes’, inMax Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2010), at para. 33:
‘Art. 25 (1) ICSID Convention requires the existence of a dispute arising directly out of an investment as a
jurisdictional requirement but does not offer a definition of the term investment’ (emphasis in original).
12 See, e.g.,Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on Jurisdic-
tion, 17 May 2007, declining jurisdiction on the ground that the alleged ‘investment’ did not contribute to
the host state’s development, as required by Art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention;Malaysian Historical Salvors,
SDN, BHDv.Malaysia, ICSIDCaseNo.ARB/05/10,Decision on theApplication forAnnulment, 16April 2009,
annulling the original award on the ground that Art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention does not require an
investment to contribute to the host state’s development.
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law, explaining the particular importance power-conferring treaties have within
that field.
Section 4 of the article will commence the discussion of the ICSID Convention
itself, presenting the background to the contemporary dispute regarding themean-
ing of the term ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) of the Convention. Section 5 will then
demonstrate that the Convention confers upon the parties to any given arbitra-
tion at ICSID the power to determine, to some degree, the meaning of the term
‘investment’ in Article 25(1), in so far as it concerns their own arbitration. Section
6 will then address Article 25(4) of the Convention, which confers upon individual
contracting states the power unilaterally to define the meaning of ‘investment’ for
any arbitration in which they are a party. Section 7 will then examine Article 64 of
the Convention, which, it will be argued, confers upon any two ormore contracting
states thepower toagreeuponadefinitionof ‘investment’ underArticle 25(1),which
is then binding in any arbitration brought by an investor from one state party to
that agreement against any other state party to that agreement. Finally, section 8
will address the ‘minimum content’ of the term ‘investment’ in Article 25(1), which
provides an outer limit beyond which no entity has been granted the power to
extend the definition of ‘investment’.
2. TREATY INTERPRETATION AND POWER-CONFERRING TREATIES
The observation that some legal rules confer powers on individuals or entities,
rather than regulating them, is far from original, being most famously made by the
legal theorist H. L. A. Hart in his criticisms of the jurisprudence of John Austin.13
Austin’s ‘command’ theory of law had attempted to explain laws entirely in terms
of commands issued by a sovereign to those over whom the sovereign has power.14
Hart’s objection to this command-centred view of law emphasized that there are
certain types of law that such a description simply does not seem to match.15
Contract law, for example, does not mandate that contracts be made, or even that
they be made in certain ways. Rather, it presents an opportunity. Individuals are
told the conditions under which the state will enforce agreements that they have
made. As a result, they are given what Hart described as a limited legislative power
to determine the legal framework that will apply to their own actions.16
Hart’s recognition of the power-conferring nature of certain legal rules is not
important because power-conferring laws cannot plausibly be described as a formof
command. Contract law, for example, can be certainly understood as constituting a
13 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1994), 96.
14 J. Austin,The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (ed.W. E. Rumble) (1995), 18: ‘A law, in themost general and
comprehensive acceptation in which the term, in its literal meaning, is employed, may be said to be a rule
laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him.’
15 Hart, supra note 13, at 24.
16 Ibid., at 96: ‘[A]s recent theory such as Kelsen’s has shown, many of the features which puzzle us in the
institutions of contract or property are clarified by thinking of the operations of making a contract or
transferring property as the exercise of limited legislative powers by individuals.’
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set of commands froma sovereign that agreements bemade in certainways.17 Hart’s
point, rather, was that doing so simply mischaracterizes the true nature of the laws
in question.18 Contract law can indeed be described as a form of command, but such
an understanding does not faithfully capture the true manner in which those laws
operate.
It is this notion of fidelity that is important in understanding the impact of the
recognition that a treaty is power-conferring on the manner in which that treaty
should be interpreted. The rules of treaty interpretation listed in the VCLT are now
recognized as reflecting customary international law, and there is no reason why
they shouldnotbeused to interpretpower-conferring treaties.However, recognition
that a treaty is power-conferring means that while traditional methods of treaty
interpretation are still applicable, applying them in the sameway as would be done
for a non-power-conferring treaty will lead to an interpretation unfaithful to the
treaty itself.
Power-conferring treaties cannot be properly understood solely through an em-
phasis on such things as the ‘object andpurpose’ of the treatyor the specific language
used in the treaty.19 Such considerations are important in determining which ele-
ments of a treaty are power-conferring and also in interpreting those elements that
are not. However, a power-conferring treaty is, by definition, not an attempt to cap-
ture an agreement between the parties to the treaty. Rather, it creates a framework
in which the wishes and views of entities and individuals other than the parties to
the treaty can have a central role in the treaty’s operation.
At the most basic level, then, recognition that a treaty is power-conferring high-
lights the need to identify precisely which entities have been granted powers under
the treaty and how they are entitled to use them. As a result, aspects of the treaty
that would ordinarily have been interpreted in a manner intended to achieve the
goals of the parties to the treaty must instead be interpreted to achieve the goals of
a non-party.
In addition, recognition that a treaty is power-conferring can even affect how the
VCLT’s rules of treaty interpretation are applied. For example, the purpose of the
ICSID Convention has often been described in terms such as ‘to promote the flow
of private investment to contracting countries by provision of amechanismwhich,
by enabling international settlement of disputes, conduces to the security of such
investment’.20 Applying therulesof theVCLTinaccordancewith thisunderstanding
of the Convention’s ‘object and purpose’ would justify taking an expansive view of
the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals. After all, the Convention cannot ‘promote the
flow of private investment’ if tribunals decline jurisdiction over cases in which an
investor alleges mistreatment by a host state.21
17 Ibid., at 33, noting the possibility of interpreting contract law as an order enforced by the sanction of the
contract being judged a nullity.
18 Ibid., at 34.
19 VCLT, Art. 31(1).
20 Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application
for Annulment, 16 April, 2009, para. 57.
21 ‘Host state’ is used in this article to refer to the state into which a foreign investment is made.
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However, when the Convention is recognized as power-conferring, this descrip-
tion of the object and purpose of the Convention becomes less plausible. Promoting
the private flow of investment certainly remains part of the Convention’s object
and purpose, but if, for example, powers to constrain ICSID jurisdiction have been
conferred on entities other than the parties to a dispute, then it is clearly not a full
account of what that object and purpose is. After all, such parties will have the
ability to exercise that power in ways that may limit the promotion of the flow of
private investment, even where that flow is desired by the host state receiving the
investment.
The remainder of this article will attempt to illustrate the impact of recogniz-
ing a treaty’s power-conferring nature by focusing on a single example of power-
conferring in a treaty: the definition of ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) of the ICSID
Convention. As will be shown, this aspect of the Convention is a particularly com-
plex example of power-conferring. Consequently, it serves as a useful example of the
effect thepower-conferringnatureof a treaty canhaveupona treaty’s interpretation.
3. THE RISE OF POWER-CONFERRING TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
The ability of legal rules to confer powers, rather than just regulate behaviour,
has come to have particular importance for international investment law since
the middle of the twentieth century. Traditionally, investors in a foreign state who
believed they had been mistreated by that state were generally required to pursue
their claim in the state’s own domestic courts.22 If this failed to generate adequate
compensation, the investor was then forced to turn to its home state23 and ask
its government to undertake ‘diplomatic protection’ efforts on its behalf.24 If the
investor’spleawassuccessful, itsgovernmentwouldenter intonegotiationswiththe
government of the host state as a means of settling the investor’s claim. Potentially,
the two governments might both consent to submit the dispute to arbitration.25
Diplomatic protection, however, has significantweaknesses as ameans of resolv-
ing international investment disputes.26 First, the home state has no obligation to
pursue the investor’s claim at all.27 It may, for example, conclude that pursuing
the investor’s claim would be incompatible with its own foreign-policy objectives
with respect to the host state. Second, even if the home state does pursue the
22 Schreuer, supra note 11, at para. 15: ‘Action in the domestic courts of the host State is the traditional way in
which investment claims are pursued, at least initially.’
23 ‘Home state’ is used in this article to refer to the state whose nationality a foreign investor possesses.
24 See generally C. F. Amerasinghe,Diplomatic Protection (2008).
25 J. Dugard, ‘Diplomatic Protection’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2010), at para. 2:
‘Today it is accepted that diplomatic protectionmayonlybe enforcedbypeacefulmeans, suchasnegotiation,
arbitration, or judicial proceedings, and not by forcible means.’
26 Schreuer, supra note 11, at para. 3, noting that diplomatic protection ‘carries serious disadvantages for the
protected investor’.
27 Ibid., at para. 13: ‘A State has the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a national. It is under no
duty or obligation to do so.’
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investor’s claim, the investor has no control over how this is done.28 Consequently,
the investor may find that its claim has been settled for far less than it believes it is
actually worth. Alternatively, if arbitration is commenced, it is the home state and
not the investor that controls the arbitration, and the investor only participates to
the extent permitted by the home state.29
While this system arguably functioned adequately for hundreds of years, the
globalizationofbusiness in the twentiethcenturybroughtoutclearly the significant
limitations of diplomatic protection.30 Increasing amounts of foreign investment
were being made into an increasing diversity of countries, which, in turn, led to
an increasing number of investment-related disputes.31 As a result, states found
themselves petitioned more and more often to intervene on behalf of a citizen or
domestic corporation that had invested abroad. Similarly, states thatwere recipients
of foreign investments found their domestic activities more frequently challenged
by other states, whose investors had been affected by the measures in question.
Finally, investors themselves complained of having to avoid potentially profitable
investments due to concerns that they would not receive adequate compensation if
mistreated by the host state.
It was in this context that, in themid-twentieth century, states began collectively
to examine methods for encouraging international investment that would both
provide an alternative to diplomatic protection and minimize the involvement of
the home state in the resolution of investment-related disputes. ICSID, created by
the ICSIDConvention,was aprimary embodiment of this goal.32 Expressly designed
as a forum in which investors and host states could resolve disputes directly with
one another, it was seen as ameans of de-politicizing investment disputes, allowing
them tobe resolved onapurely legal basis.33 More importantly for present purposes,
however, since the structure of ICSID arbitration precludes the home state from any
direct participation in the arbitral process, it also represented a grant of power to
investors, who now had primary control over their own claims.
ICSID arbitration is not mandatory, however, and will only occur where both
the host state and the investor have consented to their dispute being heard at
28 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment of 5
February 1970 at para. 78, quoted in R. D. Bishop, J. Crawford, and M. Reisman (eds.), Foreign Investment
Disputes (2005), 768: ‘[A] Statemay exercise diplomatic protection bywhatevermeans and towhatever extent
it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the national or legal person on whose
behalf it is actingconsider that their rightsarenotadequatelyprotected, theyhavenoremedy in international
law.’
29 Schreuer, supra note 11, at para. 3: ‘Under international law the investor’s State of nationality may refuse to
pursue the claim or may abandon it at any stage.’
30 A. Newcombe and L. Paradell, Lawand Practice of Investment Treaties (2009), section 1.1: ‘In the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, as the world economy became increasingly internationalized, the limits of
the diplomatic protectionmodel became apparent.’
31 Ibid., at section1.14: ‘Disputesover the treatmentof foreign investment increasedand intensifiedafterWWII
as the process of decolonization resulted in colonial territories becoming states.’
32 The most authoritative overview of ICSID and the ICSID Convention is provided in C. Schreuer, The ICSID
Convention: A Commentary (2009).
33 Indeed, if an arbitration is commenced at ICSID, the investor’s home state is precluded from exercising
diplomatic protection or bringing any sort of international claim. ICSID Convention, Art. 27.
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ICSID.34 This consent might be found in an agreement directly between the host
stateandtheinvestor;however, ithasincreasinglybeenfoundinbilateral investment
treaties (BITs) between the host state and the home state.35 This is significant for
present purposes because such treaties will include a range of substantive promises
between the two states regarding how they will treat one another’s investors.
This means, however, that although it is the investor that brings and controls an
investor–state arbitration under a BIT, the substantive rights being protected by the
arbitration are actually those of the home state, not of the investor.36 Nonetheless,
even though the investor is ultimately enforcing its home state’s rights, it has been
granted the power to pursue a claim that its home state might prefer be left alone
or refuse to pursue a claim if it finds this to be advantageous to its own business
purposes.Moreover,whenpursuingaclaim, it is the investor,not the investor’shome
state, that determineswhat argumentswill be advanced regarding how the treaty in
question should be interpreted.37 Consequently, contemporary BITs, through their
standard incorporation of investor–state arbitration, grant investors the power not
only to protect their own investments, but to determinewhen the home state’s own
substantive rights should be protected, and even the interpretation that those rights
should be given.38
Contemporary international investment law, then, has come to be dominated by
power-conferring international agreements, negotiated directly between states, but
giving significant powers to investors to control both when those agreements are
enforced and even how they should be interpreted.
4. THE CONTROVERSY REGARDING THE MEANING OF
‘INVESTMENT’ IN THE ICSID CONVENTION
If the ICSID Convention is to be understood as a power-conferring treaty, it is
necessary to clarify precisely who has been granted the right to exercise powers
under it and what those powers are. This article is not an exhaustive analysis of the
Convention and so will not attempt to identify every way in which the Convention
might be power-conferring. It will instead focus upon the power-conferring aspects
of one element of Article 25(1) of the Convention, which addresses the jurisdiction
of an ICSID tribunal.
34 See, e.g., Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States, para. 25: ‘consent of the parties is an essential prerequisite for the jurisdiction of
the Centre.’
35 The ICSID Caseload – Statistics 10 (2010), noting that a bilateral investment treaty has constituted the basis
for ICSID jurisdiction in 62 per cent of all ICSID arbitrations.
36 See, e.g., Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award on
Merits, 26 June 2003, para. 233, noting that, in investment arbitration, ‘claimants are permitted for conveni-
ence to enforce what are in origin the rights of Party states’. But see Z. Douglas, ‘The Hybrid Foundations of
Investment Treaty Arbitration’, (2003) 74 BYIL 151, at 170, arguing that investment treaties grant investors
rights of their own.
37 On the lackofhome-state involvement in the investment arbitrationprocess, see generallyA.Roberts, ‘Power
and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States’, (2010) 104 AJIL 179.
38 Atreatymay,ofcourse, alsogrant thehomeandhost states theright toresolvedisputesover the interpretation
of the treaty.However, thehome stateusually retainsnopower to intervene in anydispute resolutionprocess
between the host state and the investor.
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Oneof the foundational concepts of any formof arbitration is thatparties areonly
obligated to arbitrate in accordance with the consent to arbitration that they have
given.39 That consentneed takenoparticular formandmaybemerely formal, rather
than considered and fully voluntary,40 but, ultimately, arbitration is consensual and
unless consent to the arbitration by both parties can be found, an arbitral tribunal
has no jurisdiction.41
However, while consent is fundamental to all forms of arbitration, institutional
arbitrations include the additional possibility of a constraint based upon the nature
of the parties to the dispute or the dispute itself, rather than just party consent.
While parties may, after all, arbitrate any dispute they wish to arbitrate, arbitral
institutions have no obligation to administer any arbitration that does not meet
whatever standards they wish to impose.
In accordance with this feature of institutional arbitration, one of the distinctive
elements of the jurisdiction of a tribunal constituted under the ICSID Convention
is that the mere consent to arbitrate by the parties to the dispute does not suffice
to ground the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Instead, the ICSID Convention explicitly
restricts the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals to disputes ‘arising directly out of an
investment’.42 Consequently, even if both parties to a dispute agree to arbitrate at
ICSID, an ICSID tribunal must decline jurisdiction unless it finds that this require-
ment has beenmet.43
While potentially a fairly straightforward constraint, this aspect of the jurisdic-
tion of ICSID tribunals ultimately has come to be one of the most controversial
topics in ICSID arbitration, due to the way in which the constraint is written into
the Convention.44 Whilst Article 25(1) of the Convention explicitly restricts ICSID
arbitration to disputes ‘arising directly out of an investment’, no indication is given
anywhere in the Convention as to exactly what constitutes an ‘investment’ for the
purposes of the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal.45 As a result, ICSID tribunals have
39 See generally A. Rau, ‘Arbitral Jurisdiction and the Dimensions of Consent’, University of Texas School of
Law, Law and Economics Research Paper, No. 103, 2008.
40 See, e.g., Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 November 1985:
Egypt found to have consented to arbitrate with SPP as a result of a clause in its own foreign-investment law,
with no additional consent to arbitrate specifically with SPP being necessary.
41 See, e.g., S. Greenberg, C. Kee, and J. R.Weeramantry, International Commercial Arbitration (2011), section 3.4.1:
‘Without an arbitration agreement there can be no arbitration’; N. Blackaby and C. Partasides, Redfern and
Hunter on International Arbitration (2009), section 1.52: ‘[C]onsent is essential.Without it there can be no valid
arbitration.’
42 Convention, Art. 25(1). The Convention also includes other jurisdictional constraints, but these will not be
addressed here.
43 See,e.g.,MalaysianHistoricalSalvors,SDN,BHDv.Malaysia, ICSIDCaseNo.ARB/05/1,DecisiononJurisdiction,
17May 2007, declining jurisdiction for lack of an investment under Art. 25; Patrick Mitchell v. The Democratic
Republic of Congo, Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Award, 1 November
2006 (same).
44 See, e.g., J. D. Mortenson, ‘The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International
Investment Law’, (2010) 51 Harvard Journal of International Law 257; M. E. Hiscock, ‘The Emerging Legal
Concept of Investment’, (2008) 27 Penn State International Law Review 765; M. Jezewski, ‘There Is No Freedom
without Solidarity: Towards a New Definition of Investment in International Economic Law’, Society of
International Economic Law, Working Paper No. 51/08, 2008; D. Krishan, ‘A Notion of Investment’, in
T. Grierson (ed.), Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Debate and Discussion (2008); N. Rubins, ‘The Notion of
“Investment” in International Investment Arbitration’, in N. Horn and S. Kro¨ll (eds.), Arbitrating Foreign
Investment Disputes (2004), 283.
45 Schreuer, supra note 11, para. 33.
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been left to determine for themselves how to interpret this term and thus how
extensive their own jurisdiction should be.
While early ICSID arbitrations concerned paradigmatic cases of international
investment, such that the existence of an investment under Article 25(1) was not
challenged, the enormous growth since the mid 1990s in the number of disputes
brought to ICSID has resulted in a number of arbitrations in which the existence
of an investment was less clear.46 As a result, in a series of recent cases, states have
argued that the requirement for the existence of an investmentwas notmet and the
tribunal was therefore obligated to decline jurisdiction.47
Initially, when faced with these arguments, tribunals undertook case-by-case
evaluations,with each tribunal adopting its ownpreferred approach to thequestion.
However, by the late 1990s, enoughdecisionshadbeenmadeby ICSID tribunals that
it was possible to discern certain characteristics common among transactions that
hadbeenheld toconstitutean investmentunder theConvention.48While the lackof
precedent in arbitrationmeant that tribunalswere not actually required to conform
to these prior decisions, their existence provided a foundation for the reasoning
of subsequent tribunals, who were conscious of the need to develop some form of
consistency in the interpretation of this requirement.49
What resulted was what has come to be known as the ‘Salini’ criteria50 – five
elements that can serve as a guide for tribunals as towhether the transaction under-
lying a given dispute constitutes an investment for the purposes of Article 25(1) of
the Convention. As usually listed, the criteria are (i) a certain duration, (ii) a regular-
ity of profit and return, (iii) an assumption of risk by both parties, (iv) a significant
financial commitment by the investor, and (v) a contribution to the development of
the host state.51
The Salini criteria are argued by proponents merely to serve as an indicative
list that can assist a tribunal in determining that an investment exists, rather than
a set of criteria that must be met by any transaction underlying a dispute able
to be arbitrated at ICSID.52 However, not all tribunals and commentators agreed
with the formalization embodied in the Salini criteria, with some arguing instead
46 See, e.g., Joy Mining Machinery Ltd v. Egypt, Award on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11 (2004) (bank
guarantees); Fedax NV. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, IIC 101 (1997), Decision on Jurisdiction (debt
instruments).
47 See, e.g., Joy Mining v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, 6 August
2004; Salini Costruttori, S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23
July 2001; Fedax v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, 11 July 1997.
48 This was most famously and influentially done by Christoph Schreuer in his 2001 treatise. See C. Schreuer,
The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2001), para. 122.
49 O. K. Fauchald, ‘The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals: An Empirical Analysis’, (2008) 19 EJIL 301; C.
Schreuer and M. Weiniger, ‘Conversations across Cases: Is There a Doctrine of Precedent in Investment
Arbitration?’, 5 January 2007 (draft on file with author).
50 This name is used in reflection of the adoption of these criteria for an Art. 25(1) ‘investment’ in Salini v.
Morocco, ICSID Case No. Arb/00/04, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001, at paras. 52–57.
51 Schreuer, supra note 48, at para. 122.
52 Ibid.: ‘These features should not necessarily be understood as jurisdictional requirements but merely as
typical characteristics of investments under the Convention.’ However, seeMortenson, supranote 44, at 272,
arguing, questionably, that ‘[t]ribunals following Schreuer’s lead, however, have been far more aggressive,
converting his descriptive reflections into a prescriptive set of requirements’.
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that so long as both parties to the dispute agreed that the transaction constituted
an investment, then Article 25(1)’s requirement for an investment was met.53 As a
result, in recentyears, bothcommentators and tribunalshavedivided into twobroad
camps, followingwhat are traditionally referred to as the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’
approaches to the existence of an investment under the Convention.
According to the ‘objective’ approach, the term ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) has a
solid anddiscerniblemeaning, oftendescribed in accordancewith theSalini criteria,
that serves as an absolute constraint on the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal. As a
result, even if both parties to a dispute have agreed that the transaction underlying
the dispute constitutes an investment and both wish their arbitration to be held
under the auspices of ICSID, a tribunalmust decline jurisdictionwhere theobjective
requirements of an Article 25(1) ‘investment’ have not beenmet.
By contrast, proponents of the ‘subjective’ approach argue that while the use
of the term ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) means that any dispute held at ICSID
must indeed arise directly from an investment, the failure of the Convention to
provide any definition of ‘investment’ results from a decision to allow parties to a
dispute to determine the meaning of the term for themselves. Consequently, when
both parties to the dispute have agreed that the transaction underlying the dispute
is an investment, an ICSID tribunal should not conduct any further analysis of
the existence of the investment and merely hold Article 25(1)’s requirement of an
investment to have beenmet.
The remainder of this articlewill demonstrate thatunderstanding the ICSIDCon-
vention as power-conferringwith respect to the definition of ‘investment’ in Article
25(1) helps to resolve this dispute.While proponents of the subjective approach are
demonstrably correct that the Convention confers upon the parties to a dispute a
central role in providing content to themeaning of ‘investment’ under Article 25(1),
they are nonethelessmistaken in viewing the parties to a dispute as the only entities
granted such a power. Consequently, while the parties to any individual arbitration
do indeed have the central role in determining whether the transaction underlying
thedispute constitutes an investment for thepurposes ofArticle 25(1), they canonly
do so within the constraints of the similar powers granted to other entities.
5. THE POWER OF THE PARTIES TO A DISPUTE TO DEFINE
‘INVESTMENT’ UNDER ARTICLE 25(1) OF THE CONVENTION
The first step in establishing which entities have been conferred powers under the
ICSID Convention to determine the meaning of ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) must
be to demonstrate that Article 25(1) is indeed power-conferring. As noted already,
the term ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) is entirely undefined and hence potentially
subject to a wide variety of interpretations. However, of itself, this cannot suffice to
53 See. e.g., Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 24 July 2008, para. 317:
‘over the years, many tribunals have approached the issue of the meaning of “investment” by reference to
the parties’ agreement, rather than imposing a strict autonomous definition.’
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demonstrate that Article 25(1) is power-conferring, as this vagueness may simply
have resulted from poor drafting.
There is, though, clear evidence from the travaux pre´paratoires to the Convention
that the vagueness of the term ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) not only was deliberate,
butwas adoptedwith the explicit intent that the content of the termwould be filled
byentitiesother than thecontracting states to theConvention.Travauxpre´paratoires
must certainly be used carefully, as the VCLT is uniformly recognized as embodying
a primarily textual approach to treaty interpretation, in which the actual language
incorporated into a treaty has priority over any unexpressed intentions that the
contracting states may have had when negotiating the treaty.54 Consequently, the
use of travaux pre´paratoires to interpret a treaty can be controversial.55
Use of travaux pre´paratoires is, however, accepted practice in interpreting the
meaningof ‘investment’ inArticle25(1)of the ICSIDConvention, as theVCLT’s rules
on treaty interpretation clearly allow that use of travaux pre´paratoires is acceptable
where the meaning of a term is ambiguous or otherwise unclear.56 Yet, if any treaty
termhas everbeenambiguous, it is ‘investment’ inArticle 25(1) of theConvention.57
NotonlydoesthetermhavenouniformlyacceptedmeaningoutsidetheConvention,
but no indication is given in the Convention itself as to what the term should
be understood as meaning. There has been little controversy, then, surrounding
the repeated references that have been made to the travaux pre´paratoires of the
ICSID Convention in order to understand the meaning of ‘investment’ in Article
25(1).58
Clear evidence that the vagueness of Article 25(1) constitutes a grant of power
to entities other than the contracting states to the Convention can be found in
a famous statement in the Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (‘Report of
theExecutiveDirectors’),publishedalongside theConvention, that ‘[n]oattemptwas
made to define the term “investment” given the essential requirement of consent by
the parties’.59 That is, neither states nor investors are required to bring investment
disputes to ICSID, even if both the home and host states involved in the dispute
54 See, e.g., P. Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties (1989), para. 142: ‘The primacy of the text, especially in
international law, is the cardinal rule for any interpretation’; I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (1984), 115: ‘The Commission accordingly came down in favour of the view that the starting point of
interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the intentions
of the parties.’
55 See generally J. Klabbers, ‘International Legal Histories: The Declining Importance of Travaux Pre´paratoires
in Treaty Interpretation’, (2003) 50 NILR 267.
56 VCLT, Art. 32.
57 Mortenson, supra note 44, at 260: ‘The term “investment” is a quintessentially “ambiguous” term justifying
“[r]ecourse [to] . . . the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion”.’
58 See, e.g., Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the
Application for Annulment (2009): ‘In any event, courts and tribunals interpreting treaties regularly review
the travaux pre´paratoires whenever they are brought to their attention; it is mythological to pretend that
they do so only when they first conclude that the term requiring interpretation is ambiguous or obscure’;
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 24 July 2008: ‘On the contrary, it
is clear from the travaux pre´paratoires of the Convention that several attempts to incorporate a definition of
“investment” were made, but ultimately did not succeed.’
59 Report of the Executive Directors, para. 27.
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are signatories to the Convention. Instead, the Convention requires an independent
consent, from both the host state and the Investor, for any specific dispute to be
broughtbeforeanICSIDtribunal.60 AsindicatedbytheabovestatementintheReport
of the Executive Directors, however, the negotiating history of the Convention
clearly illustrates that the requirement of this second consent played a primary role
in convincing many contracting states to accept the vagueness of the definition of
‘investment’ in Article 25(1). As each state retained the ability to decide for itself
which disputes itwaswilling to consent to bring to ICSID, a precise definition of the
term ‘investment’ was felt to be unnecessary, as each state could effectively define
the term for itself. In this respect, then, the decision to incorporate into Article 25(1)
only the term ‘investment’, with no clarifying language, constituted a conferral of
powers upon the parties to any given dispute to define that term for themselves.
Nonetheless, this should not be understood as meaning that the parties to a
dispute have unconstrained freedom with respect to the definition of ‘investment’
that they have adopted. After all, the contracting parties could have omitted the
term ‘investment’ completely fromArticle 25(1), thereby giving parties to a dispute
total freedomtodetermine for themselveswhichof their disputes shouldbebrought
before an ICSID tribunal. The deliberate retention of this constraint, then, indicates
clearly that while parties to a dispute were to be largely free to define the term
‘investment’ however they wished, it must nonetheless accord with some broader,
party-independent meaning of the term.
Indeed, the travaux pre´paratoires make it clear that the statement quoted above
fromtheReportof theExecutiveDirectors, if takenat facevalue, ishighlymisleading,
as it is simplynot accurate to say that ‘no attempt’wasmade todefine ‘investment’.61
Rather,whileadecisionwasindeedultimatelytakennottoadoptaspecificdefinition
of ‘investment’, this decision followed a protracted series of disputes regarding the
precise definition that the term should be given.
While the Working Paper prepared to serve as an initial foundation for negoti-
ation of the Convention had completely omitted the term ‘investment’ from the
jurisdictional constraints of the Centre, this approach was rejected by negotiators
and a reference to ‘investment’ was included in all subsequent drafts.62 In addi-
tion, once the termwas incorporated within the jurisdictional constraints of ICSID
tribunals, the states negotiating the Convention did not simply proceed to ignore it,
accepting that it hadno content in andof itself. Rather, the definitionof ‘investment’
inArticle 25(1) becameapoint of high contention,withmanyproposals beingmade
60 Convention, Preamble: ‘Declaring that no Contracting State shall by the mere fact of its ratification, ac-
ceptance or approval of this Convention and without its consent be deemed to be under any obligation to
submit any particular dispute to conciliation or arbitration’; C. F. Amerasinghe, ‘The International Center
for Settlement of Investment Disputes and Development through the Multinational Corporation’, (1976)
9 Vand. JTL 793, at 800: ‘both parties to the dispute must have consented to have recourse to ICSID’; P. C.
Szasz, ‘The InvestmentDisputes Convention –Opportunities and Pitfalls: How to SubmitDisputes to ICSID’,
(1970) 5 Journal of Law and Economic Development 23, at 26: ‘Themost important jurisdictional requirement is
that of consent, by both parties, to the submission of a dispute to the Centre.’
61 See, e.g., Mortenson, supra note 44, at 292, noting ‘the startling inaccuracy of the suggestion that there was
no attempt to define “investment”’.
62 Schreuer, supra note 32, at 121–2.
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as to the precise way that it should be defined.63 It was only when it became clear
that no agreement was going to be reached on the precise meaning of an Article
25(1) investment that a proposal was accepted that no definition be adopted at all,
leaving the term ‘investment’ included within Article 25(1) but with no indication
given as to its meaning.64
The travaux pre´paratoires for the Convention, then, certainly make it clear that
the vagueness of ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) was deliberate and was intended to
conferpowerupontheparties toadispute todetermine for themselveswhether their
transaction constituted an ‘investment’. Nonetheless, they are also clear that this
conferral of power was not an unrestricted one, as the insistence of the contracting
states that the term ‘investment’ be added to the Convention, combined with the
extensive efforts made during negotiations to reach an acceptable definition of
the term, is simply inconsistent with such a claim.65 The remainder of this article
will therefore examine other entities that can be understood to have conferred the
power to determine the definition of ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) and thereby place
limitations on the power conferred on the parties to a dispute.
6. THE POWER OF HOST STATES TO CONSTRAIN THE DEFINITION OF
‘INVESTMENT’ THROUGH ARTICLE 25(4) OF THE CONVENTION
The travaux pre´paratoires of the Conventionmake it clear that the requirement for a
second consent to ICSID arbitration convinced the contracting states that itwas safe
to confer upon the parties to a dispute the central role in determining the meaning
of ‘investment’ under Article 25(1). However, the requirement for a second consent
was not the only motivating factor behind the willingness of the contracting states
to accept the vagueness of ‘investment’ under Article 25(1). Developing states in
particular had expressed concerns over the possibility that theymight be pressured
bydeveloped states or bypowerful investors into consenting to arbitrate a dispute at
ICSID. In such a situation, the need for a second consent would provide them with
absolutely no protection.
An essential part of the proposal to include ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) as an un-
defined term, then,was the addition to theConvention ofArticle 25(4), underwhich
contracting states possess the power to notify the Centre, and thereby the other
contracting states, of ‘the class or classes of disputes which it would or would not
consider submitting to the jurisdictionof theCentre’.66 Through suchanotification,
63 In the words of Christoph Schreuer, supra note 32, at 121–2, ‘[t]he subsequent discussions showed a widely
held opinion that a definition of the term “investment” was necessary’.
64 Mortenson, supra note 44, at 289–91.
65 See similarly J. M. Boddicker, ‘Whose Dictionary Controls? Recent Challenges to the Term “Investment” in
ICSID Arbitration’, (2010) 25 AUILR 1031, at 1045: ‘BIT and FTA definitions may narrow but not expand
the scope of jurisdiction granted by [Art. 25(1)]. Therefore, a BIT or an FTA alone cannot confer jurisdiction’
(footnotes omitted); Rubins, supra note 44, at 289: ‘In the end, however, a textual analysis of the Convention
and Institution Rules reveals, and commentators now agree, that there is an objective boundary to the
definition of investment for purposes of ICSID jurisdiction’ (footnotes omitted).
66 Convention, Art. 25(4): ‘Any Contracting Statemay, at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval of this
Convention or at any time thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of disputes which it would
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states could protect themselves against unacceptable pressures or overly expansive
interpretations by tribunals. A state may, for example, submit a notification that
it is unwilling to arbitrate at ICSID any disputes arising out of its domestic oil in-
dustry, thereby removing the necessity tomake such a statement in every document
including a consent to ICSID arbitration.67
On its face, this provision appears to provide states with a unilateral means of
defining ‘investment’ under Article 25(1). On such an interpretation, a state that has
declared under Article 25(4) that it will not arbitrate oil-related disputes at ICSID
cannot be forced to do so, even were it to include a consent to ICSID arbitration in
an oil-related investment contract.
Both the Report of the Executive Directors and subsequent ICSID jurisprudence
make clear, however, that Article 25(4) does not have this type of preclusive effect
on the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal.68 Consequently, even were a state to have
lodged anArticle 25(4) notification that it would not arbitrate oil-related disputes at
ICSID, if it then consented to ICSID arbitration of such a dispute, an ICSID tribunal
would uphold its jurisdiction despite the Article 25(4) notification.
Nonetheless, the role that Article 25(4) notifications had in convincing the con-
tracting states to accept the vague usage of ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) means that
Article 25(4) notifications cannot be taken to be purely symbolic. They could, after
all, hardlyhave servedas reassurance to states concernedabout thepotentialbreadth
of ICSID jurisdiction if they ultimately had no effect on that jurisdiction.
There are, then, three primary interpretations that an Article 25(4) notification
can be given: (i) a communication to investors, (ii) a reservation to the Convention,
and (iii) an exercise of a power to define ‘investment’ under Article 25(1).
6.1. Article 25(4) notifications as communications to investors
There is no question that anArticle 25(4) notification can serve as a communication
to investors regarding the types of dispute a given state is willing to arbitrate at
ICSID. It merely has to be communicated to a potential investor. In such a case,
an Article 25(4) notification would function no differently from any other non-
contractual communicationmade between contractual partners, only having effect
to the extent allowed by the applicable contract law.
The difficulty with this interpretation is that an Article 25(4) notification is not
something that a state issues as party to a dispute. That is, although it might at
some point be communicated to investors, themechanism formaking Article 25(4)
notifications does not require this to be done. Rather, an Article 25(4) notification is
communicated to ICSIDand is subsequentlycommunicated to theothercontracting
or would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. The Secretary-General shall forthwith
transmit such notification to all Contracting States. Such notification shall not constitute the consent
required by paragraph (1).’
67 Saudi Arabia has, for example, made precisely this notification. The current list of Art. 25(4)
notifications is available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&
actionVal=ContractingMeasures&reqFrom=Main.
68 Report of the Executive Directors, para. 31; PSEG Global, Inc., The North American Coal Corporation, and Konya
Ingin Electrik Uretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, 4
June 2004, at 135–47 (including a discussion of case law).
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states.69 It is, therefore, an action taken by a state in so far as it is a contracting state
to the ICSID Convention, not in so far as it is a party to an arbitration agreement
with an investor. Indeed, Article 25(4) does not require that investors be notified of
the existence of an Article 25(4) notification for it to have its effect.
It is, therefore, simply inconsistentwiththestructureofArticle25(4)notifications
for them to be understood as merely communications to investors, serving only to
modify a state’s consent to arbitration.
6.2. Article 25(4) notifications as reservations to the Convention
The secondpossibility is to considerArticle 25(4) notifications as reservations to the
Convention.Under such an interpretation, Article 25(4) gives each contracting state
to the Convention the right to exclude certain kinds of transaction from the Article
25(1) definition of investment, so long as the exclusion is not inconsistent with the
‘object and purpose’ of the Convention.70
Understanding an Article 25(4) notification as a form of reservation to the Con-
vention, however, is inconsistent with the clear recognition in the Report of the
Executive Directors and subsequent case law that an Article 25(4) notification can-
not override a clear subsequent consent to ICSID arbitration. A reservation to a
treaty, after all, affects both a state’s rights and its responsibilities under a treaty.
That is, it is not something that a state can turn on and off at will. Once a reservation
ismade, it is applicableuntil the state in questionwithdraws it.71 Consequently, if an
Article 25(4) notification constituted a reservation to the Convention, states could
not arbitrate any dispute at ICSID that was inconsistent with that reservation, even
if they consented to do so.
As already noted, however, this is simply not the way that Article 25(4) notifica-
tions function. Rather, even if a state has an Article 25(4) notification in place, it can
still arbitrate at ICSID a dispute inconsistent with that notification. Moreover, that
a state has consented to arbitrate at ICSID in a manner inconsistent with its Article
25(4) notification has no effect upon that notification’s existence. The arbitration
merely constitutes an exception to the notification, not ameans of terminating it.72
Furthermore, a fundamental element of the legal rules applicable to treaty reser-
vations is the right of other states party to the treaty to object to the reservation.
There is, however, no available mechanism for any contracting state to the ICSID
Convention to object to an Article 25(4) notification. Indeed, a state could poten-
tially become party to the Convention and then submit a notification effectively
precluding every form of investment dispute from being arbitrated at ICSID. A res-
ervation of this breadth would be challenged and removed as clearly inconsistent
69 Convention, Art. 25(4): ‘The Secretary-General shall forthwith transmit such notification to all Contracting
States.’
70 VCLT, Art. 19(c).
71 Indeed, thewithdrawal only becomes operative for any other state party to the treatywhen it receives notice
of the withdrawal. VCLT, Art. 22(3)(a).
72 PSEGGlobal, Inc., The North American Coal Corporation, and Konya Ingin Electrik Uretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi
v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, 4 June 2004, at 142, noting that ‘States making
notificationswill alwayswish to remain free to either followornot follow the termsof thenotificationwhen
expressing their consent’.
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with the ‘object and purpose’ of the Convention. As a notification under Article
25(4), however, it could remain.
Article 25(4) notifications, then, simply do not function in a manner consistent
with the recognized legal rules applicable to reservations to treaties. They cannot,
therefore, properly be understood as constituting reservations.
6.3. Article 25(4)notifications as anexercise of apower todefine ‘investment’
under Article 25(1)
An Article 25(4) notification must be understood, then, as something more than
merely informational, but less than a reservation. That is, they are best understood
as a conferral of power on each individual contracting state, to place limits on the
definition of ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) that will be applicable in any dispute in
which it is a party. They can, therefore, include any substantive restrictions that the
state wishes to include, without thereby being subject to a challenge from another
contracting state. Moreover, an Article 25(4) notification does not prevent a state’s
arbitrating a dispute at ICSID that is inconsistent with its notification. Such an
arbitration simply reflects a decision by the state not to insist upon its power to
preclude arbitration of such disputes.
RecognizingArticle25(4)notificationsas reflectingaconferralofpower,however,
nonetheless leaves the question of how they should be understood as operating.
Adapting a proposal initially advanced by Julian Mortenson, the most persuasive
interpretation is that while an Article 25(4) notification can give specificity to
the limits of a vague consent to arbitration, it cannot do so where the consent to
arbitration clearly covers the dispute in question.73
This interpretation of Article 25(4) notifications can be best illustrated through
an example. Although the example will be based upon consents to arbitration
contained in BITs between states, the same analysis can be applied to consents to
arbitration contained in agreements directly between investors and host states.
Presume that after ratifying the ICSID Convention, State A provides a notifica-
tion under Article 25(4) that it does not agree to arbitrate any oil-related disputes at
ICSID. However, it has already signed a bilateral investment treaty with State B that
explicitly includes oil-related disputes, as well as including a consent to arbitrate
any disputes at ICSID. In addition, State A subsequently signs a bilateral investment
treaty with State C that also includes consent to ICSID arbitration and, again, spe-
cifically includes oil-related disputes in its definition of ‘investment’. Finally, State
A then signs a bilateral investment treaty with State D that, again, includes a con-
sent to ICSID arbitration, but makes no reference to oil in its broad and generalized
definition of investment.
Under this example, State A’s Article 25(4) notification would have no effect
on arbitrations brought under the pre-existing bilateral investment treaty with
73 Mortenson, supra note 44, at 295. Mortenson proposes that Art. 25(4) notifications be understood as ‘pro-
spective guides . . . for interpreting future agreements’. As argued above, however, such an interpretation is
inconsistent with the fact that Art. 25(4) notifications aremade by states as parties to the Convention, not as
parties to future agreements.
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State B. State A lacks the power unilaterally to alter the terms of its agreement with
State B and hence is bound, despite its Article 25(4) notification. Moreover, as the
Article 25(4) notification reflects a power possessed by StateA to define ‘investment’
under Article 25(1), it is exercisable at State A’s discretion. Consequently, as State A
didnot denounce its BITwith State B, the best understandingof the conflict between
State A’s Article 25(4) notification and its BIT with State B is that State A chose not
to exercise that power with respect to any arbitrations brought under the BIT with
State B.
Similarly, State A’s Article 25(4) notification will have no effect on arbitrations
brought under the subsequent bilateral investment treatywith StateC.As anArticle
25(4) notification reflects a power possessed by State A, rather than an agreement
between State A and the other contracting states to the Convention, State A retains
the right to act inconsistently with its notification whenever it wishes to do so.
Moreover, State A’s agreement to arbitrate oil-related disputes with investors from
StateCdoesnotcancelormodifyStateA’sArticle25(4)notification,whichcontinues
to be applicable in the future.
However, State A’s Article 25(4) notification has an entirely different impact on
arbitrations brought under the bilateral investment treaty with State D, due to the
vagueness of the definition of ‘investment’ contained in the treaty. This vagueness
means that there is inadequate evidence that State A did not intend to have its
power to define ‘investment’ underArticle 25(1) be effectivewith respect to disputes
arising under the A–DBIT. Consequently, the Article 25(4) notification applies to all
claims brought under the A–D BIT. It does not modify the terms of that BIT and so
does not preclude oil-related disputes being arbitrated under any forum other than
ICSID that is specified in theBIT.However, it doespreclude any claimsunder it being
arbitrated at ICSID.
Article 25(4), then, is best understood as constituting a conferral of power to
individual contracting states to define ‘investment’ under Article 25(1). As such, it
can be excluded from any individual transaction, when desired by the state making
the notification, without affecting the notification’s ongoing effectiveness.
7. THE POWER OF HOME AND HOST STATES TO DEFINE
‘INVESTMENT’ IN ARTICLE 25(1) THROUGH MUTUAL
AGREEMENT
As has just been shown, home states can unilaterally alter the definition of ‘invest-
ment’ under Article 25(1) via an Article 25(4) notification. This section of the article
will demonstrate that the Convention also provides amechanism for the definition
of ‘investment’ to be defined bilaterally between a home and a host state. Moreover,
unlike the unilateral definition available via Article 25(4), a bilateral agreement
between the home and host states is binding on both and hence is not overridden
even when the host state includes a clear but inconsistent consent in an agreement
directly with an investor.
Unlike the other powers examined in this article, the power of the home and
host states to agree on a binding definition of ‘investment’ does not arise directly
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out of the incorporation of vagueness into Article 25(1). Instead, it comes from a
completely separate article of the Convention – Article 64. As will be demonstrated
below, Article 64 gives any grouping of contracting states to the Convention the
power to agree on an interpretation of any element of the Convention, which will
thenbebindingbetweenthem.Consequently, althoughthispower isnot specifically
one to define ‘investment’ under Article 25(1), it does enable states to agree on such
a definition.
As discussed earlier, prior to the creation of ICSID, investors with a legitimate
claim against a foreign government were usually forced to rely upon often unsat-
isfactory diplomatic protection efforts by their home state. Unhappiness with this
systemwas the most important motivation behind the creation of ICSID.
Given this context, although the potential risks for a host state of consenting to
arbitrate with an investor at ICSID are clear, a home state is itself not unaffected
by its ratification of the ICSID Convention. A home state that ratifies the ICSID
Convention does not just risk having claims brought against it as a host state. It also
surrenders the traditional power it had to use its investors’ claims against host states
for its larger political purposes. After all, there is no provision within the ICSID
Convention that allows ahome state to prevent one of its investor’s bringing a claim
against a host state or even just allows it to intervene in an ICSIDarbitration in order
toexpress itsownviewson thedispute.74 Ratificationof the ICSIDConvention, then,
represents a significant loss of power even for states that expect predominantly to
be home states in disputes, rather than host states.
However, although a home state does not possess any power to intervene directly
in an ICSID arbitration between one of its investors and a foreign state, Article 64
means that a state need not be entirely without influence in such a dispute. Under
this Article, contracting states are permitted to resolve any dispute regarding the
interpretation of the Convention through negotiation, prior to instituting a case
at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).75 While commentary on this Article has
focused on its grant of adjudicatory power to the ICJ, the recognition of the power of
ICSID contracting states to resolve disputes through negotiation is more important
in the present context.76
Although Article 64 has never been used, either as the foundation for a case at
the ICJ or as the ground for a negotiated agreement, its language is nonetheless clear
as to the power it grants to groups of ICSID contracting states. While a provision
acknowledging that the contracting states to a treaty retain the power to agree on
the interpretation of any element of that treatymight be unremarkable,77 Article 64
74 Under the recently adopted Rule 37 of the ICSIDArbitration Rules, a statemay nowmake a submission in an
arbitration inwhich it is not a party, but only as an amicus, at the same level as any other amicus submission.
75 Convention, Art. 64: ‘Any dispute arising between Contracting States concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the International
Court of Justice by the application of any party to such dispute, unless the States concerned agree to another
method of settlement.’
76 See, e.g.,G.Vannieuwenhuyse, ‘BringingaDisputeConcerning ICSIDCases and the ICSIDConventionbefore
the InternationalCourt of Justice’, (2009) 8LawandPractice of International Courts andTribunals 115; Schreuer,
supra note 48, at 1259–64.
77 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Art. 1131(2).
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expressly states that the power to negotiate agreed interpretations of Convention
provisions is exercisable by limited groups of contracting states anddoesnot require
the participation of all ICSID contracting states.78
As a result, Article 64 confers on groups of two or more contracting states the
power to adopt an interpretation of the Convention that will be applicable between
them, but that is potentially inconsistent with an interpretation adopted by one or
more other groups of contracting states. It is, therefore, a mechanism by which a
single treaty can ultimately be transformed into what is effectively a variegated set
of treaties, consistent inmostprovisions, butdiverging in importantwaysoncertain
points.
It should be emphasized, however, that Article 64 only gives contracting states
the power to negotiate agreements regarding the ‘interpretation or application’ of
the Convention. Consequently, it cannot be a means of altering or terminating the
Convention. The Convention, therefore, remains a single treaty, subject to a variety
of interpretations, rather than actually constituting a linked set of bilateral treaties.
With respect to the definition of ‘investment’ in Article 25(1), then, Article 64
confers on groups of contracting states the power to negotiate an agreed definition
that will be applicable in any arbitration between any contracting state party to
that agreement and an investor from another contracting state also party to the
agreement.
Article 64 does not itself specify any formal requirements for such an agreement.
Consequently, while an agreement to a particular interpretation of ‘investment’ in
Article 25(1)may take the form of an independent document, explicitly referring to
Article 64 of the Convention, nothing in Article 64 requires that this be so. Rather,
so long as an agreement between the home and host states was reached through
‘negotiation’ or ‘anothermethodof settlement’ agreedbetween the states concerned,
Article 64 makes this agreement a binding interpretation of the Convention.
The lackof formal requirements for anArticle64agreement is importantbecause,
as discussed earlier, a significant majority of recent ICSID arbitrations have been
basedonBITsnegotiatedbetweenstates, rather thanonagreementsdirectlybetween
the investor and the host state. In contrast to the ICSID Convention, however, these
BITs often include very detailed definitions of what constitutes an ‘investment’
under the BIT.
The definition of ‘investment’ in a BIT is, of course, not directly an agreement
on the definition of ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) of the Convention. Consequently,
it might initially seem that BIT definitions of ‘investment’ are simply irrelevant
to Article 64, which only applies to agreements relating to the ‘interpretation or
application’ of the Convention.79
However, this ignores the role that Article 25(1)’s definition of ‘investment’ plays
in the Convention. As noted above, negotiations regarding how to define ‘invest-
ment’ in Article 25(1) did not focus upon what an ‘investment’ should or should
78 Convention, Art. 64, referring to ‘the States concerned’.
79 Art. 64 relates to ‘[a]ny dispute arising between Contracting States concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention’ (emphasis added).
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not be understood as being. Rather, incorporation of the requirement that a dispute
‘arise directly out of an investment’ was based on the more practical question of
which types of disputes states were willing to arbitrate directly with investors.
That is, the term ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) ultimately has a functional defin-
ition. It does not refer to a substantive type of entity or activity, but rather to the
willingness of states to arbitrate directly with investors. Recognition of this point
is important because it means that an agreement between two or more contracting
states regarding the meaning of ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) does not constitute an
agreement on the particular types of things that are or are not investments under
the Convention. It is, rather, an agreement regarding the category or categories of
disputes that the states concerned are willing to have arbitrated at ICSID between
one of the states party to the agreement and an investor from another.
Consequently, when two states enter into an agreement that includes both con-
sent to ICSID arbitration and a definition of investment that acts as a jurisdictional
constraint to the states’ consent to ICSID arbitration, they have thereby reached
agreement upon precisely what constitutes the meaning of ‘investment’ under Art-
icle 25(1). They were, of course, likely not attempting to do so, as they were merely
placing a jurisdictional constraint on their ownconsent to arbitrationunder theBIT.
However, once it is recognized that ‘investment’ under Article 25(1) is a functional
term relating to the willingness of states to arbitrate directly with investors, rather
than a substantive type of transaction, then evidence of thiswillingness can provide
content to the term nomatter its source.
In accordance with the power granted to contracting states by Article 64, then, a
BIT that includes both adefinitionof ‘investment’ and a consent to ICSIDarbitration
constitutes an agreement between the two states party to the BIT that, for the
purposes of disputes arising between one of those states and an investor from the
other, ‘investment’ under Article 25(1) of the Convention has the content of the
definition provided in the BIT.
Of course, this argumentwill have no direct effect where jurisdiction of an ICSID
tribunal is based on the BIT in question, as, if the transaction does not fall within
the definition of ‘investment’ in the BIT, then an ICSID tribunal has no jurisdiction,
nomatterwhat ‘investment’means inArticle 25(1). It can, however, have important
consequenceswhere the consent to arbitration is contained inanagreementdirectly
between the investor and the host state, but the transaction underlying the dispute
doesnot qualify as an ‘investment’ under an existingBITbetween thehost andhome
states.
In sucha situation, thedefinitionof ‘investment’ in theBITbecomes incorporated
into the ICSIDConvention as an agreed refinement of the definition of ‘investment’
inArticle25(1), foranydisputes involvingoneofthetwostatespartytotheBITandan
investor from the other. Consequently, if the transaction underlying the agreement
between the investor and the state does not fall within the definition included in
the BIT, it thereby also does not fall within Article 25(1) of the Convention.80
80 This situation has not served as the basis of an ICSID dispute yet, but with the enormous number of BITs
now in effect, it will plausibly arise in the future.
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That is, whenever a BIT includes both a consent to ICSID arbitration and a
definitionof ‘investment’ that serves as a jurisdictional limiton that consent, neither
state party to the BITmay arbitrate a dispute at ICSID that arises out of a transaction
thatwould not qualify as an ‘investment’ under the BIT, even though the arbitration
is brought based on a consent in a separate agreement directly between the investor
and the host state.
8. THE MINIMUM CONTENT OF THE DEFINITION OF ‘INVESTMENT’
IN ARTICLE 25(1)
This article has been concernedwith elucidating the entities that have been granted
thepowertodefine ‘investment’underArticle25(1)of theConventionandthemeans
bywhich they can exercise that power.However, the history of the negotiations that
resulted inArticle 25(1)makes clear that thesepowerswerenotunconstrained. That
is, while entities other than the contracting states to the ICSID Convention have
been granted the power to define ‘investment’ under Article 25(1), they have not
been given complete freedom to do so. Such a claimwould, after all, make nonsense
of the insistence that the term ‘investment’ be included within Article 25(1), as it
would eliminate the ability of the term to act as a constraint. There must, then, be
some element of control over the definition of ‘investment’ that has been retained
by the contracting states to the Convention – some ‘minimum content’ that even
those entities granted the power to define ‘investment’ do not have the power to
eliminate. The concluding section of this article will be dedicated to explaining the
nature of this ‘minimum content’ and how it can be identified.
8.1. The problem of interpretative subjectivity
Before addressing directly the manner in which the minimum content of Article
25(1)’s definition of ‘investment’ should be analysed, it is important to note the un-
avoidable need for a tribunal-independent understanding of thisminimumcontent.
That is, even proponents of the ‘subjective’ approach to the interpretation of
Article 25(1) concede that theremust be some outer limit to themeaning of ‘invest-
ment’, such that even party agreement to bring certain types of dispute to ICSID
cannot suffice to ground a tribunal’s jurisdiction.81 However, it is clearly untenable
to maintain that the decision not to incorporate a precise definition of ‘investment’
intoArticle 25(1)was taken because it was decided that themeaning of ‘investment’
was clear andno further specificitywas required.Although theprinciple architect of
theConvention,AronBroches, did indeed suggest that one justification for omitting
adetaileddefinitionof ‘investment’wasprecisely that theexistenceofan investment
was readily recognizable, the inability of the negotiating states to reach a consensus
81 See, e.g.,Mortenson, supranote44, suggestingasa limit that thedisputemustarise froma ‘plausiblyeconomic
activity or asset’;Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on
the Application for Annulment, 16 April 2009, acknowledging the ‘fundamental assumption that the term
“investment” does not mean “sale”’.
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on the definition despite extensive efforts indicates clearly that if any consensus
existed on the definition of ‘investment’, it was at a very basic level.82
There is, then, simplyno single clear definitionof ‘investment’ towhich tribunals
attempting to interpret Article 25(1) can appeal. As a result, each tribunal has, of
necessity, been forced to rely upon its own intuitive understanding of what is or is
not ‘obviously’ not an investment.83
The difficulty this creates is that while the Convention clearly conferred upon
the parties to a dispute the power to define ‘investment’, it did not do the same
for arbitral tribunals. Yet, any tribunal that bases an interpretation of Article 25(1)
on the intuitions of its members regarding what does or does not constitute an
investmenthas indeed exercised this power. That is, the tribunal has determined the
meaning of ‘investment’ under Article 25(1), but not through interpretation of the
Convention or identification of the views of the parties to the dispute. It has, rather,
simply imposed the view that its ownmembers prefer.
The difficulty in such a view is apparent. The arbitrators have been selected
by the parties in a procedure that allows them to be selected because of cer-
tain substantive views they hold, including on the definition of ‘investment’ in
Article 25(1).84 However, when ruling on the outer boundaries of Article 25(1)’s
definition of ‘investment’, tribunals are determining precisely the minimum con-
tent of the term that was explicitly reserved from the definitional power conferred
on the parties. Consequently, by appealing to their own intuitions in determining
the ‘minimum content’, the tribunal allows the parties to take control of precisely
that element of the definition of ‘investment’ that the contracting states restricted
from party control.
This situation causes a serious practical problem because, under Article 54 of
the Convention, contracting states, even though not themselves either the host
state or the home state in a given dispute, undertake to enforce the pecuniary
obligations of any ICSID award.85 Consequently, unless there is aminimumcontent
to the definition of ‘investment’ that is beyond the power of either the parties or
the home and host states to define, other contracting states will be obligated to
enforce awards resulting from disputes concerning transactions that are plausibly
an ICSID investment only because the parties or the home and host states agreed
that they wanted it to be. This approach entirely eviscerates the constraint that
82 Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application
for Annulment, 16 April 2009: ‘[I]n the debate over the draft of that Report, Mr. Broches recalled that none of
the suggested definitions for theword “investment” had proved acceptable. He suggested thatwhile itmight
be difficult to define the term, an investment in fact was readily recognizable.’
83 P. Vargiu, ‘Beyond Hallmarks and Formal Requirements: A “Jurisprudence Constante” on the Notion of
Investment in the ICSID Convention’, (2009) 10 Journal of World Investment and Trade 753, at 767: ‘ICSID
tribunals constituted after the Joy Mining decision have usually provided their own interpretation of the
notion of investment, comprised of a variable number of elements treated sometimes as mere hallmarks,
sometimes as formal requirements.’
84 Convention, Art. 37(2)(b): ‘Where the parties do not agree upon the number of arbitrators and the method
of their appointment, the Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each party
and the third, who shall be the president of the Tribunal, appointed by agreement of the parties.’
85 Convention, Art. 54: ‘EachContracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention
as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a
final judgment of a court in that State.’
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ICSID be a centre for the resolution of investment disputes, and only investment
disputes.86
Despite the variety of ways already discussed inwhich the host state, home state,
and investors can give content to Article 25’s definition of investment, then, it is
clear that there must be a constraint on their freedom. Moreover, this constraint
must be one objectively ascertainable and not merely confined to the discretion of
the arbitrators in each dispute.
Nonetheless, this does not entail that the minimum content of ‘investment’ in
Article 25(1) must be invariant. As the next subsection of this article will argue,
the minimum content of an Article 25(1) ‘investment’ is best understood as being
evolutionary in nature, changing over time to reflect changing understandings of
the meaning of the term. As a result, the meaning of the term is to be determined
through an examination of the contemporary practice of all contracting states to
the Convention, rather than by attempting to discern the meaning of ‘investment’
at the time the Convention was signed or by imposing any other form of invariant
definition.
8.2. Determination of theminimum content of an Article 25(1) investment
As has been argued above, the term ‘investment’ in the Convention has content
beyond that provided by either party agreement or agreement between the host and
homestates.However, it is also indisputable thatno single definitionof the termwas
acceptable to all contracting states when the Convention was negotiated. The best
insight into the nature of theminimum content of an Article 25 investment comes,
therefore, from considering the terms under which the contracting states to the
Convention would plausibly see the term ‘investment’ as providing a substantive
jurisdictional constraint, even without the incorporation of a clear definition.
The inability to reach agreement on even themost basic elements of a definition
preclude the notion that the term was simply intended to refer to some extra-
Convention definition of ‘investment’, such as might be found in economics or
some other branch of international economic law.87 In addition, the willingness of
the contracting states to allowparties to disputes and home andhost states to define
‘investment’ differently at different times and contexts is inconsistent with the idea
that they simultaneously agreed to limit their own impact upon the definition of
‘investment’ to a single usage currently being made of the term at the time the
Convention was concluded.
86 While this expansive view of the power of parties to a dispute over Art. 25(1)’s definition of ‘investment’
has not been adopted by a tribunal, it can be seen in commentary. See, e.g., Mortenson, supra note 44, at 299:
‘There is a good case that the historical agreement was for the requirement [of an investment] to have no
administrable effect – that it is a nonjusticiable norm whose enforcement depends solely on the give and
take among political entities’; Y. Andreeva, ‘The Tribunal inMalaysian Historical Salvors v. Malaysia Adopts
a Restrictive Intepretation of the Term “Investment”’, (2008) 25 Journal of International Arbitration 503, at 506:
‘[G]iven that the term “investment” is not defined in the Convention and is instead set out in great detail in
the BIT. Is it not the will of the states that submit themselves to ICSID jurisdiction that matters most? Is it
not the way they choose to define covered investments that sets the boundaries for that jurisdiction?’
87 Cf., e.g., Krishan, supra note 44, proposing the adoption of the International Monetary Fund’s definition of
‘investment’.
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Rather, as has already been noted, the travaux pre´paratoires show that the concern
motivatingthedisputesover thedefinitionof ‘investment’ inArticle25(1)concerned
theobligationof states to enter into investor–state arbitration, notwhat does or does
not actually constitute an investment. Recognizing this fact, it is clear that a tribunal
attempting to determine whether a transaction falls within the minimum content
of the term ‘investment’ in Article 25(1) of the Convention should similarly focus
on identifying whether that transaction is a type of transaction that contracting
states to the Convention are currently willing to submit directly to investor–state
arbitration. This can be done through examining whether the transaction would
constitute an ‘investment’ under other agreements concluded by the contracting
states to the Convention that also include consent to investor–state arbitration.
Importantly, however, as the concern is not with the definition of ‘investment’,
butwith thewillingness to submit to investor–statearbitration, theonlyagreements
that are relevant to this determination are those that include consent to investor–
state arbitration.88 Where the term ‘investment’ is used in agreements that do not
include consent to investor–state arbitration, even if they are also in some way
related to international investment, such usages of ‘investment’ are not directly
relevant for determining the meaning of the term under Article 25(1).
Of course, thepractice of states in this respect changes constantly andhas evolved
considerably in the period since the ICSID Convention came into force.89 The min-
imum content of ‘investment’ under Article 25(1), then, must be understood as
evolutionary, reflecting at any given time the types of ‘investment’ that states are
willing to arbitrate directly with investors.90
The consequence of such a conclusion is that it is simply impossible to make
any form of absolute statement regarding what is or is not an investment under
Article 25(1) of the Convention. Rather, while a certain form of transactionmay not
currently constitute anArticle 25(1) investment, changing practicemay result in its
becoming one in the future. Similarly, a type of transaction currently regarded as a
paradigm formof investmentmaywell lose its status in the future if practice begins
to exclude it.
The question remains, however, how widespread the agreement to arbitrate a
particular type of transaction must be before it is taken to have been incorporated
intoArticle 25(1)’s definition of ‘investment’. It is tentatively suggestedhere that the
appropriate standard is that used to determinewhether a rule of customary interna-
tional law has developed. That is, if the inclusion of a particular type of transaction
within the definition of ‘investment’ in relevant international agreements has not
88 It should be emphasized that the relevant issue is consent to investor–state arbitration, not merely ICSID
arbitration.
89 See generallyM.Malik,RecentDevelopments in theDefinition of Investment in International InvestmentAgreements,
Second Annual Forum of Developing Country Investment Negotiators (2008) (on file with author).
90 The idea that treaty terms can have an evolutionary meaning has recently been endorsed by the ICJ, in
Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment of 13 July 2009, para. 66:
‘[W]here the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily having been aware that the
meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the treaty has been entered into for a very
long period or is “of continuing duration”, the parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended
those terms to have an evolvingmeaning.’
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reached a level of uniformity and diversity that would support, in another context,
a finding of the existence of a rule of customary international law, then the type of
transaction in question should not be found to have been incorporated into Article
25(1)’s definition of ‘investment’.91 Onlywith such a standard can the consent of the
large number of states signatory to the ICSID Convention be respected.
9. CONCLUSION
States have long used treaties as a means of protecting or advancing the interests of
entities who themselves have no direct role in the treaty’s formation or execution.
The goal of this article has been to emphasize that there is, however, a subset of
treaties that are best understood not merely as attempting to benefit entities other
thanthestatescreatingthem,butasconferringonthoseentitiessignificantpowersto
affect the treaty’s operation.Moreover, recognition that a treaty is power-conferring
can significantly affect the interpretation of a treaty, with the traditional focus on
the goals and intentions of the states party to the treaty no longer always being
appropriate. This has been illustrated through an analysis of one aspect of power-
conferring that occurs in the ICSIDConvention. The ICSIDConvention is, however,
by no means the only power-conferring treaty in existence. Moreover, adoption of
such treaties can reasonably be expected to increase in the future, in reflection of
the partial retreat of the state frommany areas of traditional governmental control.
The recognition that a treaty is ‘power-conferring’, however, does not ultimately
determine anything specific about the way the treaty should be interpreted, but
merely indicates an important element of the treaty that must be taken into con-
sideration. Each power-conferring treaty must, therefore, be analysed on its own
terms, with the traditional rules of treaty interpretation providing the means of
determining what powers have been conferred, and on whom.
Nonetheless, as the analysis of the power-conferring aspects of the definition of
‘investment’ under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention has attempted to demon-
strate, recognition that a treaty is power-conferring can substantially alter the way
that a treaty is interpreted, and therefore cannotmerely be subsumed under a tradi-
tional contracting state-centred approach to treaty interpretation.
91 A finding of customary international law also requires a finding of opinio juris; however, this element is not
relevant in the present context.
